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COMMENTS
RHODE ISLAND v. INNIS: A WORKABLE DEFINITION OF
"INTERROGATION"?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rhode Island v. Innis,1 the Supreme Court addressed for the first
time the issue of what constitutes interrogation under Miranda v. Ari-
zona.2 Innis is a significant decision in the criminal procedure area not
only because of the workable standard for determining "interrogation"
which it sets forth, but also because it signals the Burger Court's decision
not to overrule Miranda or to further disparage its effectiveness.3 How-
ever, Innis by no means represents a return to the Warren Court's solici-
tous approach to a suspect's Miranda rights.4 The Burger Court still has
not raised Miranda's protections and strictures to the status of constitu-
tionally mandated provisions,5 nor has it ceased its tacit balancing of the
government's interest in using evidence against the competing interests
1. 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (6-3 decision; Stewart, J.).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Stone, The Mi-
randa Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99. Professor Stone notes that the
disfavor into which Miranda has fallen with the Burger Court is reflected both in the
Court's substantive decisions and in the manner in which it has exercised its power to de-
cide which cases on its docket to review. For example:
[During the 1973-1976 Terms,] the Court has granted certiorari in only one of the
thirty-five cases on its appellate docket in which a defendant sought review of a lower
court decision holding evidence admissible over a claimed violation of Miranda. Dur-
ing the same period, the Court has granted certiorari in thirteen of the twenty-five
cases in which the government sought review of a lower court decision excluding evi-
dence on the authority of Miranda.... In ten of these cases, the Court interpreted
Miranda so as not to exclude the challenged evidence. In the remaining case, the
Court avoided a direct ruling on the Miranda issue, holding the evidence inadmissible
on other grounds. In effect, then, the Court has not held a single item of evidence
inadmissible on the authority of Miranda.
Id. at 100-01.
4. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325-26 (1969) (Miranda warnings required prior to
police interrogation of defendant in bedroom when defendant effectively under arrest);
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968) (Miranda warnings required prior to routine
interrogation by IRS agents of defendant imprisoned on an unrelated offense).
5. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (Miranda's procedural safeguards are
"not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.").
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that might be served by exclusion. 6 Arguably, the Court still balances
with a presumption in favor of the government.
H. Miranda v. Arizona: THE PRECEDENT
A. Miranda's Concerns and Protections
In Miranda v. Arizona,7 the Supreme Court articulated detailed guide-
lines for the custodial interrogation of criminal suspects by law enforce-
ment officers.8 The Miranda Court was concerned with the corresponding
objectives of deterring police misconduct and protecting the rights of the
accused, while not unnecessarily burdening effective law enforcement.9
The Court noted that, due in part to the traditionally incommunicado
setting of police interrogation, the use of physical and especially psycho-
logical coercion to compel a suspect to confess could not be eradicated
6. Id. at 448. See Stone, supra note 3, at 121.
In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977), Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting
opinion called for an individualized consideration or balancing in determining whether evi-
dence should be excluded because of violations of Miranda's safeguards. The Chief Justice
stated:
[W]e weigh the deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct, together with the norma-
tive Fifth Amendment justifications for suppression, against "the strong interest
under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all concededly
relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce"...... We also
"must consider society's interest in the effective prosecution of criminals ... "
Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974)).
7. 384 U.S. 436. The constitutional groundwork for Miranda was laid in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964), which held the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination appli-
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment due process clause and enforceable
according to the same standards in both federal and state proceedings. Id. at 6, 10-11. Mi-
randa was also foreshadowed by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), where the Court
excluded a confession obtained from a suspect during custodial interrogation after he had
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his attorney, who was present at
the police station. Id. at 490-91. However, Escobedo was based not on the fifth, but on the
sixth amendment right to counsel during each "critical stage" of a criminal prosecution. Id.
at 488. After Miranda, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) limited Escobedo to its
facts, and also held that Miranda had no retroactive application. Id. at 732-34. Subse-
quently, the Court held the sixth amendment inapplicable until formal adversary proceed-
ings are initiated against a defendant, either by "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indict-
ment, information, or arraignment." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972).
See generally Project, Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Su-
preme Court and Courts of Appeals 1978-1979, 68 Gao. L.J. 279, 361 (1979); Project,
Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals 1977-1978, 67 GEo. L.J. 317, 390 (1978).
8. See note 13 infra and accompanying text.
9. 384 U.S. at 450-53. See also Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda:
What is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 16-18 (1978).
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effectively without limitations upon the interrogation process.10 Moreover,
limitations were necessary, the Court reasoned, because the atmosphere
of custodial interrogation "carries its own badge of intimidation""" and
involves "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would
otherwise not do so freely."12
Therefore, the Court in Miranda held that the prosecution may not use
inculpatory or exculpatory statements derived from custodial interroga-
tion as evidence at trial unless it demonstrates that certain procedural
safeguards s to secure the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination were employed in conducting the
interrogation.1 4
B. Miranda's Definition of "Custodial Interrogation"
The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody15 or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant
10. 384 U.S. at 460-64.
1L Id. at 457.
12. Id. at 467.
13. Id. at 479. Miranda held that unless other equally effective means are devised to pro-
tect the individual's fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the de-
fendant "must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given and such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer questions or make statements." Id, The burden is on the prosecution to
demonstrate that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived these rights before interro-
gation. Id. at 444-45, 479.
14. The fifth amendment states: "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.. . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See Grano, Rhode Island v.
Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confes-
sions, 17 Am. Cam. L. REv. 1, 23 n.145 (1979). Grano points out that the prohibition against
compelling defendants to answer questions during preliminary examinations did not gain
acceptance until the nineteenth century, long after the fifth amendment's adoption. Id. See
also Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,
73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1038-40 (1964).
15. Miranda equated "custody" with the "point that our adversary system of criminal
proceedings commences." 384 U.S. at 477. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964),
the Court had held "when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its
focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession--our adversary system begins
to operate ... ." Id. See generally Grano, supra note 14, at 45 (Miranda did not merely
seek to protect the suspect from the pressures of custody; it sought to reduce the inherent
1981]
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way."116 The Miranda decision did not in any way bar volunteered state-
ments.17 In fact, the Court expressly held that "[clonfessions remain a
proper element in law enforcement" and are admissible as evidence, pro-
vided they are "given freely and voluntarily without any compelling
influences."1
However, Miranda's definition of "custodial interrogation"19 failed to
delineate the scope of interrogation under the decision. Though the defi-
nition did not require actual, formal custody to activate the safeguards
articulated by the Court, 0 nowhere did it state whether "questioning"
refers merely to formal, express police questioning or to other statements
or actions by the police equivalent to constructive questioning as well.
Thus, the stage was set for Innis.
III. THE BACKGROUND OF Rhode Island v. Innis
A. The Facts
On January 17, 1975, shortly after midnight, police in Providence,
Rhode Island received a telephone call from a taxicab driver reporting
that he had been robbed by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun."1 The
driver reported that he left his assailant in a section of Providence known
as Mount Pleasant. Just one day before this incident, the body of another
taxicab driver who had died from a shotgun blast to the back of his head
had been found buried in a shallow grave near Coventry, Rhode Island.
compulsion of custodial interrogation).
16. 384 U.S. at 444, 477. The Court changed its opinion in three places between the
printing of the advance sheets and the final form, so that the phrase "in any significant
way" would always modify "the deprivation of freedom of action." Comment, Custodial
Interrogation, 35 TENN. L. Rzv. 604, 610-11 (1968). See generally Smith, The Threshold
Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C. L. Rgv.
699, 706-32 (1974); Comment, Miranda v. Arizona: The Emerging Pattern, 12 U. RICH. L.
REv. 409, 420-28 (1978); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).
Miranda's definition of custodial interrogation was initially broadened to include ques-
tioning outside the police station. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325-26 (1969); Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968). However, custodial interrogation subsequently has
been narrowed to exclude even police station questioning when a defendant appears volun-
tarily and is allowed to leave afterwards without hindrance. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (questioning of defendant who came voluntarily to police sta-
tion in response to police request and left after 30 minute interview is not custodial inter-
rogation under Miranda).
17. 384 U.S. at 478.
18. Id. Miranda does not define "compelling influences."
19. Id. at 444, 477.
20. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
21. 446 U.S. at 293-94.
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While the taxicab driver who reported the armed robbery was at the
Providence police station to give a statement, he recognized a picture of
his assailant on a bulletin board. A photo array was prepared by a police
officer, and the driver again identified a picture of the same person. The
pictures that the driver identified were of Thomas G. Innis.
At approximately 4:30 am. on January 17, a patrolman spotted Innis
on a public street in the Mount Pleasant area, near where the driver said
he had left Innis earlier that evening. Innis, who was unarmed, was ar-
rested and advised of his Miranda rights then,2 2 and twice thereafter.
When Innis was advised of his rights the third time, he stated that he
understood them and requested an attorney.28
Innis was then placed in a police car with Officers Gleckman, McKen-
na, and Williams, to be taken to the central police station.24 The officers
had been instructed not to question, intimidate or coerce Innis in any
way. While enroute to the police station, Officer Gleckman initiated a
conversation concerning the missing shotgun with Officer McKenna.25 In
substance, Officer Gleckman stated that while on patrol he had fre-
quented the area where Innis was arrested and had observed many handi-
capped children in the area because a school for handicapped children
was located nearby.28 Officer Gleckman then remarked, "God forbid one
22. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
23. 446 U.S. at 294. Miranda held: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have
an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent
questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney, and he indicates that he wants one
before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent." 384 U.S. at 474.
One author views this directive of the Miranda Court as dictum because none of the cases
before the Court in Miranda involved a defendant who had asked to consult with counsel.
Grano, supra note 14, at 37 n.227.
24. Innis was placed in a caged wagon, a four-door police car with a wire screen mesh
between the front and rear seats. 446 U.S. at 294.
25. There was conflicting testimony about the exact seating arrangements in the police
car, but it is clear that everyone in the car heard the conversation between Gleckman and
McKenna. Id. at 294 n.1.
26. Officer Gleckman testified:
At this point, I was talking back and forth with Patrolman McKenna stating that I
frequent this area while on patrol and [that because a school for handicapped chil-
dren is located nearby,] there's a lot of handicapped children running around in this
area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might
hurt themselves.
Id. at 294-95.
Officer McKenna testified: "I more or less concurred with him [Gleckman] that it was a
safety factor and that we should, you know, continue to search for the weapon and try to
find it." Id. at 295.
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of [the handicapped children] might find a weapon with shells and...
hurt themselves [sic]. ''
At this point, after traveling approximately one mile, Innis interrupted
the conversation and stated that they should return to the scene of the
arrest so that he could show them where the shotgun was located. Upon
return to the scene, where a search for the weapon was already in pro-
gress, Innis was again advised of his Miranda rights. Innis replied that he
understood his rights, but stated "that he 'wanted to get the gun out of
the way because of the kids in the area in the school.' "28 Innis then led
the police to the gun.2 9
B. The Lower Court Decisions
1. The Decision of the Trial Court
At trial, the shotgun and testimony concerning Innis' statement were
admitted into evidence over Innis' motion to suppress.30 The jury found
Innis guilty of kidnapping, robbery, and murder.-" The trial judge found
that Innis "had been 'repeatedly and completely advised of his Miranda
rights' [and] . . . that it was 'entirely understandable that [the officers in
the police vehicle] would voice their concern [for the safety of handi-
capped children] to each other.' "32 Therefore, the trial judge reasoned,
Innis' decision to inform the police of the location of the shotgun consti-
Officer Williams testified: "He [Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the little-I believe
he said girl-would pick up the gun and maybe kill herself." Id.
One commentator notes that "'God forbid,' and 'gee, it would be too bad' simply do not
sound like the kind of language police officers would be likely to use when engaged in a
normal casual conversation among themselves. On the other hand, these phrases seem ide-
ally suited to an emotional appeal to a suspect's humanitarian impulses." White, Rhode
Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of his Right to Counsel, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 53, 68 (1979).
See F. INBAu & J. REED, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 60 (2d ed. 1967) (dis-
cussing the utilization of displays of understanding and sympathy in urging a suspect to tell
the truth); Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Re-
cord, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 238-43 (1977).
27. 446 U.S. at 294-95.
28. Id. at 295.
29. Id. The shotgun was found in a nearby field under some rocks by the side of the road.
30. Id. at 295-96.
31. Id. at 296.
32. Id. But see White, supra note 26, at 68, where the author speculates that an immedi-
ate concern for the safety of the handicapped children was probably not paramount in the
officers' minds because other officers were already preparing a search of the area for the
weapon. Thus, the chance that a handicapped child would find the weapon at a time when
officers were absent was slight.
[Vol. 15:385390
DEFINITION OF "INTERROGATION"
tuted an "intelligent waiver 33 of his [Miranda] right to remain silent. '' 4
The trial court did not consider the issue of whether the police had "in-
terrogated" Innis within the meaning of Miranda.35
2. The Decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
holding and set aside Innis' conviction.36 Relying in part upon the reason-
ing of Brewer v. Williams,37 the court held that Innis had invoked his
Miranda right to counsel and that he had been "interrogated" by the
police officers in violation of Miranda's mandate that in the absence of
counsel all interrogation cease, unless a valid waiver is first obtained."
The court found that Innis had been subjected to the "subtle compul-
sion 39 of the officers' dialogue, which the court equated with Miranda
33. 446 U.s. at 296. Miranda held that the burden is on the prosecutor to demonstrate
that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. 384 U.S. at 475. To
show waiver, the Court has held that the State must prove the "intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). However, it is unclear whether the
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" test is stricter in
the sixth amendment right to counsel context than the "knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary" waiver test as applied in the fifth amendment context. See 68 GEo. L.J. supra note 7,
at 369-70 n.705. Later, in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), the Court held that
an explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding of waiver.
The Court stated that a valid waiver could be determined from the particular facts and
circumstances of each case, considering such factors as the conduct, background, and experi-
ence of the accused.
34. 446 U.S. at 296.
35. Id. The trial court did not consider whether "conversation" of the officers amounted
to interrogation, but merely sustained the admissibility of the shotgun and the testimony
related to its discovery based upon Innis' alleged waiver of his Miranda right to remain
silent.
36. State v. Innis, - R.I. , 391 A.2d 1158 (1978).
37. 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (Stewart, J.). See notes 117, 119-21 infra and accompanying text.
38. 391 A.2d at 1162. The court held:
The finding of a waiver in this situation would be highly. inconsistent with the con-
duct of the defendant, who just minutes before had chosen to exercise his right to
counsel before being subjected to questioning .... There is no evidence in the
record before us indicating that defendant affirmatively waived his fifth amendment
rights at this time other than the fact that he ultimately agreed to assist the police in
locating the incriminating evidence.
Id. at 1163-64 (emphasis in the original).
39. Id. at 1162. See Kamisar, supra note 9, at 23 (quoting E. HoPKINs, OuR LAWLESs
POLICE 194 (1931)):
It has been said that "there are a thousand forms of compulsion" and that "our police
show great ingenuity in the variety employed".... If the police conduct is designed
and likely to pressure or persuade, or even "to exert a tug on," a suspect to incrimi-
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interrogation, 40 and that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
of waiver of Innis' right to counsel."
C. The Supreme Court Decision and the Definition of Interrogation
The Supreme Court granted certiorari42 to determine for the first time
the meaning of "interrogation" under Miranda v. Arizona.4s The Court
reversed the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding that Innis had been
"interrogated" within the meaning of Miranda.44 Justice Stewart,45 for
the majority, stated that the Miranda safeguards 46 are activated
nate himself... then that conduct is "compulsion" as Miranda defines the self-
incrimination clause. Then it augments or intensifies the tolerable level of stress,
confusion, and anxiety generated by an unadulterated arrest and detention to the
impermissible level of "compulsion."
Id. (emphasis in original).
The Court has held "a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever
may have been the character of the compulsion." Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1924) (sick man's statements after being subjected to interrogation for seven days
inadmissible).
Apparently, "subtle compulsion" was first used by the Court in Miranda: absent a valid
waiver, any statement taken after a suspect invokes his rights "cannot be other than the
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." 384 U.S. at 474. But see Kamisar, supra note 9,
at 18 n.112 (absent "'questioning' or some other form of prodding or persuasion, the 'com-
pulsion' inherent in arrest and detention does not rise to the level of compulsion within the
meaning of the privilege" against self-incrimination). See also Grano, Voluntariness, Free
Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859 (1979).
40. 391 A.2d at 1162. Most commentators who have addressed the issue of Miranda inter-
rogation have recognized that nonverbal police conduct may be tantamount to interrogation
for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings. See generally 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 826a,
at 383 n.23 (rev. ed. 1970). See also C. MCCORMCK, EVMIENCE § 152, at 330 (2d ed. 1972);
Graham, What Is "Custodial Interragation'?: California's Anticipatory Application of Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. RFy. 59, 107 (1966); Rothblatt & Pitler, Police Interroga-
tions, Warnings, and Waivers-Where Do We Go From Here?, 42 NoTRE DAME LAw. 479,
486 (1967).
41. 391 A.2d at 1163.
42. State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (1978), cert. granted, 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
43. Professor Grano predicted prior to the Supreme Court's decision that "reversal [of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision] seems certain given both the room for principled
disagreement and the Court's failure in this decade to hold any evidence inadmissible solely
on Miranda grounds." Grano, supra note 14, at 3. In addition, he noted that the trend of
the Court continued during the 1978 term. Id. at 3 n.17. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (Miranda does not require an
explicit waiver of rights). See also Kamisar, supra note 9, at 78; Stone, supra note 3, at 100-
01.
44. 446 U.S. at 304.
45. Justice Stewart, who also wrote the majority opinion in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977), was one of the four dissenting Justices in Miranda.
46. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or
its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term 'interrogation' under Mi-
randa refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or ac-
tions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to ar-
rest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response47 from the suspect.
48
Justice Stewart then stated that "[t]he latter portion49 of this definition
focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the
intent of the police." 50
The Court recognized that Innis had been subjected to "subtle compul-
sion,151 but found that this factor alone was insufficient to constitute in-
terrogation under Miranda."2 The Court held that "[i]t must also be es-
tablished that a suspect's incriminating response was the product of
47. The Court stated: "By 'incriminating response,' we refer to any response-whether
inculpatory or exculpatory-that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.".446 U.S.
at 300 n.5 (emphasis in original).
48. Id. at 300-01. Prior to the Supreme Court's final decision in Innis, a leading criminal
law authority analyzed the facts of Innis under the assumption, which he rejected, that the
sixth amendment applied. He contended that the Rhode Island Supreme Court erroneously
found fifth amendment interrogation for sixth amendment reasons. He noted that under the
sixth amendment, "[e]ven if the officer in Innis did not intend to elicit information from the
defendant, he must have known-he certainly should have known-that his statements cre-
ated a substantial risk of accomplishing that result." Grano, supra note 14, at 33. He also
asserted that "[i]f sixth amendment rights were applicable in Innis, analysis of the waiver
issue under a proper sixth amendment standard would lead to a decision in the defendant's
favor." Id. at 35.
49. The Court's reference to "the latter portion" of the definition apparently refers to
"[words or actions] that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat-
ing response from the suspect." 446 U.S. at 301.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 303.
52. Id. But see White, supra note 26, at 62 who contends:
When the police take action that leads a suspect who is in custody and in their pres-
ence to believe that the police want him to disclose incriminating information, the
coercive pressures that Miranda was designed to prevent are activated. The combina-
tion of the sizpect's restraint and his awareness of both the police presence and their
desire for a response produces the same quality of pressure as that generated by
traditional police questioning of a suspect in custody.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467; Kamisar, supra note 9, at 51. Accord, Common-
wealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973) (any police action likely to elicit a
confession constitutes Miranda interrogation); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292,
285 A.2d 172 (1971) (same). Contra, Haire v. Sarver, 437 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1971) (defen-
dant's statements after arrest correcting wife's responses to police interrogation admissible
despite failure to give Miranda warnings); Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713 (10th Cir.
1967), (Miranda does not prohibit admission of voluntary exculpatory statements of
defendant).
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words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."83
The Court reasoned that "[g]iven the fact that the entire conversation
[between the officers] appears to have consisted of no more than a few
offhand remarks, we cannot say that the officers should have known that
it was reasonably likely that Innis would so respond [with7 an incriminat-
ing statement]."5' Because the Court concluded that Innis was not "inter-
rogated" for Miranda purposes the Court did "not reach the question
whether [Innis] waived his right under Miranda to be free from interro-
gation until counsel was present."5 The Court distinguished the facts of
the case from situations where police carry on a "lengthy harangue" in
the suspect's presence," where "the officers' comments [are] particularly
'evocative,' -57 or where the officers know or recognize that the suspect is
"peculiarly susceptible" to their appeals or "unusually disoriented or
upset."59
IV. ANALYsis or Innis
A. An Objective Standard Narrowly Applied
The definition of interrogation articulated by the Court represents the
reaffirmation of Miranda's attempt to objectify the law of confessions"s
and the complete abandonment of the subjective voluntariness test 1
which some critics had feared the Court would revitalize to replace Mi-
53. 446 U.S. at 303. To illustrate this point, the Court reasoned that if the police merely
had passed the site of the weapon en route to the station and Innis, noticing for the first
time the proximity of the school for handicapped children, had stated that he would show
the officers where the gun was located, it could not seriously be argued that this "subtle
compulsion" constituted interrogation under Miranda. Id. at 303-04 n.10.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 298 n.2.
56. Id. at 303.
57. Id. The Court apparently rejected part of the Assistant Public Defender's argument
that the officers violated Innis' rights by engaging in an "emotionally evocative" conversa-
tion immediately after Innis invoked his right to counsel, and that the violation was not
curable by fresh Miranda warnings. [1979] 26 Cim. L. Rap. (BNA) 4080, 4082 (review of
oral arguments in Innis).
58. 446 U.S. at 303.
59. Id.
60. See Note, Police Use of Trickery as an Interrogation Technique, 32 VAND. L. Rav.
1167, 1171, 1180 (1979). But see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), where the Court
apparently reaffirmed the independent viability of the pre-Miranda due process voluntari-
ness standard.
61. See VAND. L. REV., supra note 60, at 1173-80 for an examination and review of the
pre-Miranda voluntariness standard.
394 [Vol. 15:385
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randa.'2 However, Innis does not represent the Burger Court's acceptance
of the rationale and spirit of Miranda, but rather a mere adherence to the.
existence of Miranda in its restricted form.e3
In defining interrogation, the Court avoids relying on either the officer's
or the suspect's subjective perceptions" and articulates a test in objective
language concentrating on what the police officers should have known or
foreseen to be the reasonable result of their words or actions.63 The Court
operates on the premise that police officers are not responsible for the
unforeseeable, unreasonable results of their conduct." Justice Marshall
effectively evaluates the Court's definition as "an objective inquiry into
the likely effect of police conduct on a typical individual, taking into ac-
count any special susceptibility of the suspect to certain kinds of pressure
of which the police know or have reason to know. ' '67
62. See id. at 1180-82.
63. See generally Stone, supra note 3, at 168-69. Observe also the language of Chief Jus-
tice Burger's concurrence in Innis: "Since the result is not inconsistent with Miranda v.
Arizona ... I concur in the judgment. The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably
clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule
Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date." 446 U.S. at 304. As one article states:
Given the more restrictive alternative available to an otherwise anti-Miranda Court
[i.e., holding that interrogation for Miranda purposes meant express questioning], it
is surprising that the justices arrived at such a seemingly expansive interpretation of
custodial interrogation. But arguably the most surprising part of the Innis opinion
was the (C]ourt's excessively narrow application of its new standard to the facts in
the case.
Welch & Collins, A Two-Faced Approach to Miranda, Nat'l L.J., June 16, 1980, at 15, col. 1.
(The authors contend that although Innis may be interpreted as a significant departure
from previous Burger Court efforts to restrict Miranda, ambiguities in the opinion indicate
a contrary result.).
64. See 446 U.S. at 301-02 nn.7, 8. See generally United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d. 540, 544
(2d Cir. 1969), which concerned the proper focus for determining when police questioning
constitutes Miranda interrogation, and held that "a standard hinging on the inner inten-
tions of the police would fail to recognize Miranda's concern with the coercive effect of the
'atmosphere' from the point of view of the person being questioned. [Moreover,] any formu-
lation making the need for Miranda warnings depend on how each individual being ques-
tioned perceived this situation would require a prescience neither the police nor anyone else
possesses." Id.
65. Cf. White, supra note 26, at 67 n.107 which states:
In the unusual case where the suspect has a unique personal characteristic which is
unknown to the police, the question may arise as to whether the proposed objective
standard should focus upon an "average person" who has the suspect's actual charac-
teristics or an "average person" with the characteristics known to the police. While
the former might provide greater sixth amendment protection, the latter might be
preferable since it would provide clearer guidance for the police and the courts.
66. 446 U.S. at 301-02.
67. Id. at 305 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens, in his dissent, criticizes the narrowness of the Court's
definition and proposes an objective standard for determining whether a
defendant has been interrogated within the meaning of Miranda.8 His
standard requires that "any police conduct or statement that would ap-
pear to a reasonable person in the suspect's position to call for a response
must be considered 'interrogation"' for Miranda purposes.69
Although the majority opinion construes Miranda interrogation more
narrowly than do the dissenting opinions,70 it does not construe it as nar-
rowly as some may have predicted. The Court does not limit Miranda
interrogation to express questioning, but notes Miranda's concern with
the inherent compulsion of the "interrogation environment '71 and ex-
tends interrogation to include the "functional equivalent" of express
questioning 72-"words or actions on the part of police... that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect.1
7 3
B. The "Focus" of the Definition
Although the Court states that "the latter portion 7 4 of its standard for
determining whether interrogation has occurred "focuses primarily upon
the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police,' 75 the
Court throughout the Innis opinion focuses upon the officers' perceptions
of Innis to determine whether the officers should have known that their
conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from Innis. 7 6 The Court never inquires into Innis' perceptions of the of-
ficers' dialogue, nor into how a reasonable person in Innis' position would
have perceived the officers' remarks under the circumstances.77 Therefore,
68. Id. at 309, 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 311.
70. Justices Marshall and Brennan reach a different result by applying the same standard
as the Court; Justice Stevens reaches a different result by applying a standard which focuses
on the reasonable person's objective perception of whether the police conduct reasonably
called for a response.
71. 446 U.S. at 299. See 384 U.S. at 457-58.
72. 446 U.S. at 301.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 301.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 300-02.
77. See Welch & Collins, supra note 63, at 15, col. 1:
Possibly what the Court said in its [Innis] opinion is not really what it meant. It said
that police behavior determined to be "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response" constituted custodial interrogation. In making this determination, the
Court added, "the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police"
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as Justice Marshall indicated in his evaluation,78 the Court's statement of
the "focus" of the latter portion of the definition of interrogation may be
reasonably interpreted to mean the suspect's perceptions as knownt by the
police rather than the intent of the police.79
C. The Significance of Deliberate Elicitation
Perhaps the most debatable aspect of Rhode Island v. Innis is the
Court's apparent de-emphasis of police intent to interrogate.80 As stated
above, the focus of the definition of interrogation is on police perceptions
rather than intent.81 According to the Court:
This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to
vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coer-
cive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying in-
tent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably
likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to
interrogation."1
The Court does not hold police intent totally irrelevant to the determi-
nation of interrogation. Instead, it is held relevant as one factor in deter-
mining "whether the police should have known that their words or ac-
tions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. 8 3 The
Court assumes that "where a police practice is designed to elicit an in-
criminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will
not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely
to have that effect.""
would be the deciding factor. But the Court never inquired into Innis' perceptions of
the officers' dialogue. Instead, the majority focused exclusively on how the officers
perceived Innis.
78. 446 U.S. at 305. Justice Marshall perceives the Court's definition to be "an objective
inquiry into the likely effect of police conduct on a typical individual, taking into account
any special susceptibility of the suspect to certain kinds of pressure of which the police
know or have reason to know." Id.
79. Id. at 301-02.
80. Id. at 301-02 n.7.
81. Id. at 301.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 301-02 n.7.
84. Id. The Court states: "Any knowledge the police may have had concerning the un-
usual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important
factor in determining whether the police should have known that their words or actions
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 302 n.8.
But see id. at 303 n.9: "The record in no way suggests that the officers' remarks were
designed to elicit a response.... It is significant that the trial judge, after hearing the
officers' testimony, concluded that it was 'entirely understandable that [the officers] would
1981]
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Arguably, the Court is holding that deliberate attempts to elicit infor-
mation from an accused who has asserted his right to counsel are not
forbidden as long as it can be found that such deliberate attempts were
not reasonably likely to be successful.8 5 This reasoning appears to deviate
from the mandate of Michigan v. Mosley"6 which held that the crux of
Miranda is that the suspect's right to cut off questioning until counsel is
present must be "scrupulously honored."8" Therefore, to allow any delib-
erate elicitation, regardless of the likelihood of success, substantially re-
stricts the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings to protect the suspect's
rights.8 8
D. The Emphasis of the Court's Narrow Application of the Definition
The Court narrowly applies the definition of interrogation to the facts
of the opinion, tacitly emphasizing the character of the officers' state-
ments by focusing on the lack of evidence or indication that the officers
knew or should have known that Innis was "peculiarly susceptible" to the
topic of their conversation or that he was "unusually disoriented or up-
set" at the time of arrest.89 The officers' dialogue is dismissed as "no more
than a few offhand remarks" which the officers should not have reason-
ably foreseen to strike a "responsive chord" in Innis.90 This lack of fore-
seeability appears to be the controlling factor of the opinion.
In substance, the Innis majority implicitly emphasizes the "good faith"
of the police in this case, and the unexpected, voluntary nature of Innis'
response.9 1 This result may add subjectivity and difficulty to the already
voice their concern [for the safety of the handicapped children] to each other.'"
However, even if Officer Gleckman had "intended" to elicit an incriminating response
from Innis, this intent may not have made it any more likely that Innis would so respond.
As Justice Stevens points out, the Court's assumption that "where a police practice is
designed to elicit an incriminating response. . . , it is unlikely that the practice will not also
be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect" is
"extremely dubious" since "police often interrogate suspects without any reason to believe
that their efforts are likely to be successful in the hope that a statement will nevertheless be
forthcoming." Id. at 310, 311 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 310, 311 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (Miranda rights were not violated when first officer immediately
closed questioning at defendant's request, and second later questioning was by another offi-
cer concerning another event unrelated to the topic of the first questioning).
87. Id. at 104.
88. 446 U.S. at 311-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Stone, supra note 3, at 129-
37.
89. 446 U.S. at 302-03.
90. Id. at 303.
91. Stone, supra note 3, at 124. The author commented:
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overburdened fact-finding process."2
E. Future Application by the Courts
An examination of Justice Marshall's dissent reveals the rationale for
questioning the majority's application of the definition of interrogation.
While adopting the majority's definition of interrogation, Justice Mar-
shall reaches an antithetical result. Where the majority seems to operate
on the presumption that the police officers acted legally and in good faith,
Justice Marshall seems to examine objectively the "totality of the circum-
stances" in the light most favorable to the suspect. 3
Justice Marshall notes that Innis was arrested at 4:30 am., handcuffed,
searched, advised of his rights, and placed in the back seat of a patrol car
with three police officers who immediately began to discuss the search for
the shotgun and the danger it posed to the handicapped children in the
area. " He views these facts as exemplary of the coercive environment Mi-
randa sought to alleviate.' 5 Therefore, the conversation that the majority
perceives to be "no more than a few offhand remarks," is perceived in
this dissenting opinion as one of the strongest appeals to the conscience
of any suspect-the appeal to help find the shotgun and thus avert a
handicapped child's death."
Justice Marshall distinguishes this case from the situation "where po-
Use of a good faith defense... places a premium on ignorance. Moreover, a good
faith defense would add an additional, and exceptionally difficult, fact-finding opera-
tion to the already overburdened criminal process. Except in the most unusual cir-
cuestances, determination of whether a mistake of law was "reasonable" is hardly an
easy task. The existence of such a defense could generate uncertainty and invite
calculated risks on the part of the police, thereby defeating the primary goal of
Miranda.
Id.
Justice Stevens also expressed concern that "the Court's test creates an incentive for po-
lice to ignore a suspect's invocation of his rights in order to make continued attempts to
extract information from him." 446 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Stone, supra note 3, at 24.
93. The "totality of the circumstances" test was a component of the old subjective, due
process voluntariness test. The phrase was first used by the Court in Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191 (1957), but the test existed in substance long before the phrase was coined by the
Court. See generally 32 VAI4D. L. Rzv., supra note 60, at 1180-82.
94. 446 U.S. at 305.
95. 384 U.S. at 458.
96. 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally F. INBAU AND J. REID, CIMI-
NAL INTERROGATION AND CoNnmsioNs 60-62 (2d ed. 1967) for a discussion of displays of
understanding and sympathy to urge a subject to tell the truth; Kamisar, supra note 26, at
23843.
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lice officers are speaking among themselves and are accidentally over-
heard by a suspect"' because in Innis, the officers were conversing in the
close quarters of a police car in the suspect's presence. Therefore, it
should be reasonable to conclude that "[t]hey knew [Innis] would hear
and attend to their conversation, and [that] they are [thus] chargeable
with knowledge of and responsibility for the pressures to speak which
they created."98
Whether the Court's application of the definition of interrogation is an
"aberration"99 as Justice Marshall perceives it, which will be corrected in
future decisions, or followed as a model remains to be seen. Presently, it
appears that the Court's definition of interrogation may be applied to the
facts of a particular case in a manner most favorable either to the law
enforcement officers or to the suspect, depending upon the court's
inclination.
In addition, Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion anticipates
that trial judges will have difficulty interpreting and discerning "the
boundaries and nuances" of the definition.100 Apparently, the Chief Jus-
tice is referring to the necessity for the court to determine the reasonable-
ness of a police officer's evaluation of a suspect's susceptibility in resolv-
ing whether the officer "should have known that his words or actions were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 101
Justice Stevens also anticipates the problems which lower courts will
have in consistently applying the Court's definition of interrogation to
similar fact situations because of the difficulties of proof inherent in the
definition.10 2 For example, under the Court's definition of interrogation,
Officer Gleckman's expression of his "concern" for the safety of handi-
capped children in the area was not interrogation as conceptualized in
Miranda v. Arizona.'0 However, Justice Stevens hypothesizes that if Of-
ficer Gleckman had expressed his concern in the form of a direct question
to Innis, or if he had specifically referred to Innis in his announcement to
the other officers, this might have constituted Miranda interrogation.104
97. 446 U.S. at 306.
98. Id. at 306-07.
99. Id. at 307.
100. Id. at 305.
101. Id. at 302 n.8.
102. Id. at 311 n.10.
103. Id. at 312-13.
104. Id. Justice Stevens considered the three different ways that Officer Gleckman could
have communicated his concern about the dangers posed by the shotgun:
[Officer Gleckman] could have:
(1) directly asked Innis:
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F. Future Application by the Police
In addition to the potential problems lower courts will have in applying
the definition of interrogation, police officers themselves will probably
find the standard burdensome and difficult to interpret and apply. Both
Chief Justice Burger'05 and Justice Stevens'" express this latter concern.
The Chief Justice notes the burden the Court places on the police officer
"to evaluate the suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused"''1 in the
brief time available after arrest. It is also observed that "[flew, if any,
police officers are competent to make the kind of evaluation seemingly
contemplated" by the Court.'" This observation poses the question of
whether an officer who does not possess the necessary skill, training, or
ability to make such evaluations will be held to the same standard as a
more skilled and able counterpart.21 "
Justice Stevens also implies that the Court's standard fails "to give po-
lice adequate guidance in their dealings with suspects who have requested
counsel.""' 0 This concern is legitimate because the majority opinion may
be perceived as abstract and ambiguous in its guidelines, for it does not
articulate what the police can or cannot safely do. The Court merely
Will you please tell me where the shotgun is so we can protect handicapped school
children from danger?
(2) announced to the other officers in the wagon:
If the man in the back seat with me should decide to tell us where the gun is, we
can protect handicapped children from danger.
or (3) stated to the other officers:
It would be too bad if a little handicapped girl would pick up the gun that this man
left in the area and maybe kill herself.
Justice Stevens perceived these statements as interrogation because "all three appear to be
designed to elicit a response from anyone who in fact knew where the gun was located." But
under the Court's test, Justice Stevens asserted that the third statement would not be inter-
rogation. Id. at 312. Justice Stevens appears to be overlooking the Court's implication that
intent or design are relevant in determining what the officers should have known. Id. at 301-
02 n.7, 303-04 n.10.
105. Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
106. Id. at 307, 313 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
108. Id.
109. In other words, will the Court in future cases consider the personal qualities of the
law enforcement officer in applying its "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse" test? For example, in his attempt to convince the Court that Gleckman was only
"making an off-hand remark" without an "attempt to exploit any weakness of [Innis]," Den-
nis J. Roberts, Attorney General of Rhode Island, argued that "Gleckman was simply a
patrol officer" with only" 18 months experience." [1979] 26 CraM. L. REP. (BNA) 4080-81.
110. 446 U.S. at 311 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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holds that "subtle compulsion" is not the equivalent of interrogation,""
and thus statements, evidence, or confessions obtained through its use are
not as a matter of law inadmissible. The Court does state that either the
officers' intent, knowledge and exploitation of a suspect's susceptibility,
or the evocative or coercive nature of their conversation may render a
result different from that reached in this case 12 but Justice Stevens also
contends that the Court implies that deliberate elicitation may be permis-
sible.113 Consequently, what an officer may say and do before he pro-
gresses from "subtle compulsion" to "interrogation" is still ambiguous
and will probably vary from court to court.
G. Confusion with the "Exclusionary Rule"
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens states that "[in limiting its
test to police statements 'likely to elicit an incriminating response,' the
Court confuses the scope of the exclusionary rule with the definition of
'interrogation.' "114 Justice Stevens' meaning is not apparent, but it is
possible that he is referring to the recent decisions of the Court which
have curtailed the scope of the exclusionary rule in fourth amendment
cases by balancing, i.e., by requiring the exclusion of the evidence only if
the possible deterrent effects outweigh the societal costs of suppression."'
This implication that the Court is actually balancing is especially relevant
in view of Chief Justice Burger's recent suggestion that the balancing test
should be extended and applied under the fifth and sixth amendments
when the case involves no egregious police misconduct and the reliability
of the evidence is not in doubt.11
H. The Conflict Between Fifth and Sixth Amendment Standards
As Chief Justice Burger points out in his concurrence, the majority
opinion fails to clarify the conflict between Innis and Brewer v. Wil-
liams,117 i.e., the tension between the fifth and sixth amendment protec-
111. Id. at 303.
112. Id. at 302-03.
113. Id. at 310-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 309 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-71 (1978); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 454 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974). See generally 68
Go. L.J., supra note 7, at 385 n.811.
116. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
117. 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) is
factually similar to Innis in that neither defendant was expressly questioned by the police,
both incidents occurred in the isolation of a police car, and both defendants had requested
counsel. However, in other areas, the Brewer facts are clearly distinguishable from those of
[Vol. 15:385
DEFINITION OF "INTERROGATION"
tions and standards. 118 The Brewer decision could be based purely on
sixth amendment grounds.19 In Brewer, the Court held that the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated by the police
officer's deliberate attempt to elicit information from him through the
"Christian burial speech." 2 However, the Court also specifically upheld
the lower court ruling that the speech was, in effect, the equivalent of
interrogation and that the constitutional claim to counsel would not
"have come into play if there had been no interrogation.' ' 21
Innis. First, Detective Leaming's "Christian burial speech" in Brewer was expressly directed
at the defendant, while in Innis Officer Gleckman's remarks were directed at another officer.
Second, evidence existed that Detective Learning formulated his speech deliberately to elicit
an incriminating response from Williams, while no such evidence existed in Innis. Third,
Detective Learning knew of Williams' special susceptibility and suggestibility, i.e., that Wil-
liams was a former mental patient and unusually religious, and these factors were exploited
in his speech. Fourth, Williams had obtained counsel and had been arraigned; thus, judicial
proceedings had been initiated and his sixth amendment right to counsel had attached.
118. See 446 U.S. at 300 n.4, 310 n.7. Note Justice Harlan's observations concerning the
fifth and sixth amendment tensions in Miranda:
The Court's opinion in my view reveals no adequate basis for extending the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to the police station. Far more im-
portant, it fails to show that the Court's new rules are well-supported, let alone com-
pelled, by Fifth Amendment precedents. Instead, the new rules actually derive from
quotation and analogy drawn from precedents under the Sixth Amendment, which
should properly have no bearing on police interrogation.
384 U.S. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119. 430 U.S. at 400, 406. The Court in Brewer stated:
There is no need to review in this case the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, a doctrine
designed to secure the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
... [flor it is clear that the judgment before us must in any event be affirmed upon
the ground that Williams was deprived of a different constitutional right-the right
to the assistance of counsel.
Id. at 397-98.
120. 430 U.S. at 392-93. Addressing Williams as "Reverend," Detective Leaming said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road
Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's
sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be
dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I
feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is,
that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you
yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on
the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the
parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who
was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we
should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying
to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all.
Id.
121. Id. at 400. Prior to Brewer, the Court formulated a "deliberate elicitation" test for
determining whether a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated.
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Both interrogation and attachment issues are the apparent causes of
the confusion between the fifth and sixth amendment protections. The
sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings,122 while the fifth amendment right to
counsel under Miranda attaches at the beginning of the adversary process
of custodial interrogation. 123 The Court apparently places a heavier bur-
den on the government to establish waiver of the sixth amendment right
to counsel than it does to establish waiver of the fifth amendment
right.12
Although the facts in Brewer v. Williams are clearly distinguishable
from those in Innis, 25 the tension between the decisions is evident. For
example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that the facts of Innis
"relating to the waiver issue dovetail the Brewer case. '12 6 Moreover, in
his dissenting opinion in Innis, Justice Stevens stated that he regarded
"the two cases [as] indistinguishable" since Innis had invoked his right to
counsel.1 27 Therefore, Justice Stevens reasoned, "[i]n both cases the po-
lice had an unqualified obligation to refrain from trying to elicit a re-
sponse from the suspect in the absence of his attorney. 128
The core of the confusion between the fifth and sixth amendment stan-
dards appears to be that the members of the Court cannot reach a general
agreement as to whether Brewer v. Williams is relevant to the fifth
amendment interrogation issue. A decisive factor in this disagreement is
the question of when the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches.
Innis does not answer this question for us.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (Stewart, J.). Recently, the Court stated that
it was "not persuaded ... that Brewer... modified Massiah's 'deliberately elicited' test"
and held that a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel is violated-when officers "in.
tentionally [create] a situation likely to induce [a suspect] to make incriminating state-
ments without the assistance of counsel" after the adversary criminal proceedings have be-
gun. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271, 274 (1980) (Burger, J.) (emphasis added).
122. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (sixth amendment cannot apply before
"the initiation of advesary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by formal charge, prelim-
inary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.").
123. 384 U.S. at 477.
124. Kamisar, supra note 9, at 30. The rationale for this heavier burden on sixth amend-
ment waivers may be justified both by the more advanced state of the criminal proceedings
and by the fact that the sixth amendment right to counsel, unlike the fifth amendment right
to counsel, is expressed in the Constitution. Id.
125. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
126. 391 A.2d at 1164.
127. 446 U.S. at 310 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Innis attempts to formulate a "workable" definition of interrogation as
conceptualized in Miranda. The Innis definition may be interpreted as
restricting the scope of Miranda's protections of the suspect, especially
when viewed in the context of the Burger Court's other decisions which
narrow Miranda's application. Yet, Innis simultaneously appears to devi-
ate from these other decisions. The rather expansive, objective definition
of interrogation adopted by the Court reaffirms Miranda's position in the
law of criminal procedure, particularly in view of the more restrictive al-
ternative open to the Court of holding that Miranda interrogation applies
only to express questioning. Moreover, though the Court narrowly applies
the definition to the facts of Innis, it does not restrict lower courts to
such a narrow application of the standard. However, there are problems
inherent in the definition, particularly in the use of ambiguous language
and in the failure to clarify the conflicting rationales between the fifth
and sixth amendments. These issues will need to be addressed by the
Court in the future. Meanwhile, the lower courts will have to construe the
Innis definition of interrogation.
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